1967
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
January 25, 1967
The First Decade
The Partnership had its tenth anniversary during 1966. The celebration was appropriate -an all-time record (both
past and future) was established for our performance margin relative to the Dow. Our advantage was 36 points
which resulted from a plus 20.4% for the Partnership and a minus 15.6% for the Dow.
This pleasant but non-repeatable experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the Dow. Virtually
all investment managers outperformed it during the year. The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the thirty
stocks involved. Several of the highest priced components, which thereby carry disproportionate weight
(Dupont, General Motors), were particularly poor performers in 1966.
This, coupled with the general aversion to
conventional blue chips, caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment experience, particularly during
the last quarter.
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before
allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
Year
Overall Results From
Dow (1)
Partnership Results (2)
Limited Partners’
Results (3)
1957
-8.4%
10.4%
9.3%
1958
38.5%
40.9%
32.2%
1959
20.0%
25.9%
20.9%
1960
-6.2%
22.8%
18.6%
1961
22.4%
45.9%
35.9%
1962
-7.6%
13.9%
11.9%
1963
20.6%
38.7%
30.5%
1964
18.7%
27.8%
22.3%
1965
14.2%
47.2%
36.9%
1966
-15.6%
20.4%
16.8%
Cumulative Results
141.1%
1028.7%
641.5%
Annual Compounded
Rate
9.7%
29.0%
23.5%
(1)
Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through
ownership of the Dow during
that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2)
For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout
the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general
partner.
(3)
For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for
allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.
but before monthly
withdrawals by limited partners.
100 On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
Year
Overall Results From
Dow
Partnership Results
Limited Partners’
Results
1957
-8.4%
10.4%
9.3%
1957 – 58
26.9%
55.6%
44.5%
1957 – 59
52.3%
95.9%
74.7%
1957 – 60
42.9%
140.6%
107.2%
1957 – 61
74.9%
251.0%
181.6%
1957 – 62
61.6%
299.8%
215.1%
1957 – 63
95.1%
454.5%
311.2%
1957 – 64
131.3%
608.7%
402.9%
1957 – 65
164.1%
943.2%
588.5%
1957 – 66
122.9%
1156.0%
704.2%
Annual Compounded
Rate
11.4%
29.8%
23.9%
Investment Companies
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open-end investment
companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the
two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
Year
Mass.
Inv.
Trust (1)
Investors
Stock (1)
Lehman (2)
Tri-Cont
(2)
Dow
Limited
Partners
1957
-11.4%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
9.3%
1958
42.7%
47.5%
40.8%
33.2%
38.5%
32.2%
1959
9.0%
10.3%
8.1%
8.4%
20.0%
20.9%
1960
-1.0%
-0.6%
2.5%
2.8%
-6.2%
18.6%
1961
25.6%
24.9%
23.6%
22.5%
22.4%
35.9%
1962
-9.8%
-13.4%
-14.4%
-10.0%
-7.6%
11.9%
1963
20.0%
16.5%
23.7%
18.3%
20.6%
30.5%
1964
15.9%
14.3%
13.6%
12.6%
18.7%
22.3%
1965
10.2%
9.8%
19.0%
10.7%
14.2%
36.9%
1966
-7.7%
-10.0%
-2.6%
-6.9%
-15.6%
16.8%
Cumulative
Results
118.1%
106.3%
142.8%
126.9%
141.1%
641.5%
Annual
Compounded
Rate
8.6%
7.9%
9.8%
9.0%
9.7%
23.5%
(1)
Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2)
From 1966 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965.
Estimated for 1966.
These investment company performance figures have been regularly reported here to show that the now is no
patsy as an investment standard. It should again be emphasized that the companies were not selected on the
basis of comparability to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. There are important differences including: (1) investment
companies operate under both internally and externally imposed restrictions on their investment actions that are
not applicable to us; (2) investment companies diversify far more than we do and, in all probability, thereby
101 have less chance for a really bad performance relative to the now in a single year; and (3) their managers have
considerably less incentive for abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.
However, the records above do reveal what well-regarded, highly paid, full-time professional investment
managers have been able to accomplish while working with common stocks.
These managers have been
favorites of American investors (more than 600,000) making free choices among many alternatives in the
investment management field. It is probable that their results are typical of the overwhelming majority of
professional investment managers.
It is not true, however, that these are the best records achieved in the investment field. A few mutual funds and
some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases,
substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours
and not within my capabilities.
However, they are generally managed by very bright, motivated people and it is
only fair that I mention the existence of such superior results in this general discussion of the record of
professional investment management.
Trends in Our Business
A keen mind working diligently at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of wrong
conclusions.
The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated
during the next decade.
They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with
$105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is
frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership
capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement
his investment philosophy.
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the
Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and
$105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first
page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here.
However, someone evidently doctored
my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below
the "value to a private owner" criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also
experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The
problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be
enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are
understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance
meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow.
In the last three years we have
come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance.
Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced
literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution
of one's own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment;
(2) our increased size; and (3) substantially more competition.
102 It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a
steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow.
This is
true because there is only so much one can digest (million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar
bank accounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one
to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years.
However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don't
go for the "If you can't lick 'em, join 'em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward "If you can't join ‘em, lick
'em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment
decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the
chrzaszcz.
(That's a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to
anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called "fashion" investing has frequently
produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents
an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my
intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament.
I will not invest my own
money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations,
where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the
most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly
so that we may all take alternative action.
Analysis of 1966 Results
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1966.
Specifically, we had a total
overall gain of $8,906,701 derived as follows:
Category
Average Investment
Overall Gain
Controls
$17,259,342
$1,566,302
Generals – Private Owner
$1,359,340
$1,004,362
Generals – Relatively
Undervalued
$21,847,045
$5,124254
Workouts
$7,666314
$1,714,181
Miscellaneous, including US
Treasury Bills
$1,332,609
$(18,422)
Total Income
$9,390,677
Less: General Expense
$483,976
Overall Gain
$8,906,701
A few caveats are necessary before we get on with the main discussion:
An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your
memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. we'll be
glad to give you a copy.
103 2.
The classifications are not iron-clad.
Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to
category is sometimes arbitrary.
Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative
to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above
figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on
December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50%
result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market
values in calculating the average investment.
All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are
deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific
investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category.
When securities
are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable
average investment category.
The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or
two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of
all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections
made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative
suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and
are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.
Controls
There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies.
These arose through: (1)
retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock
below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the
controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to $2,600,838 in 1966.
However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other
relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by $1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation applicable to
controlling interests as of December 31, 1966. Thus the overall gain in the control category was reduced to
$1,566,058 for the year.
We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and
not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss,
perhaps substantial, during the year.
This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially
during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation
will prevail during 1967.
Generals -Private Owner
Our performance here falls in the "twenty-one dollars a day, once a month" category. In the middle of 1965 we
started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private
owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get $10 million or more invested at the
favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we
could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers,
104 suppliers, ex-employees, etc.
Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could
buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.
At yearend 1965 we had invested $1,956,980 and the market value of our holding was $2,358,412 so that
$401,432 was contributed to performance luring 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the
market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett
Partnerships Ltd.’s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners
(psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been
floating) but would have enhanced long term performance.
The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our
cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.
An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long
term results occurred in 1966. Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued a tender offer which
foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wisest course (it may not
have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of $1,269,181 in
February, of which $867,749 was applicable to 1966.
While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can
be sure I don't delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected
in 1966 results.
However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had
been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the stock at the
depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year's market environment.
Good ideas were a dime a dozen, such a premature ending would not be unpleasant. There is something to be
said, of course, for a business operation where some of the failures produce moderate profits. However, you can
see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas by examining our average investment in the Private Owner
category - we came up with nothing during the remainder of the year despite lower stock prices, which should
have been conducive to finding such opportunities.
Generals - Relatively Undervalued
Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our
largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966.
This investment has substantially out-performed the
general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year's
performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance
over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what
caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net
assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing
our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices.
Such constant evaluation and
comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.
It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals
-Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which
outperformed the market. We simply don't have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are
continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable
performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the
relative merits of our largest holding.
Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller
portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance –
some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I
105 use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading
in a long term oriented business such as ours.
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year's letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains
(forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term
performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better
long term performance.
To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be
completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to
offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for
hoped-for good long term performance.
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one's
head is being held under water." This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our
operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience
which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this
category in 1966.
Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about $1.6 million (it could be
bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock price up to a point where it
was not relatively attractive. Though our overall gain was $728,141 on an average holding period of six and a
half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of
time while we accumulated a really substantial position.
Workouts
In last year's letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some
past years. I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of $7,666,314
employed in this category. Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout section so that our net
equity capital employed was really something under this figure and our return was somewhat better than the
22.4% indicated on page six. Here, too, we ran into substantial variation.
At June 30, our overall profit on this
category was $16,112 on an average investment of $7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily
good second half offsetting a poor first half.
In past years, sometimes as much as 30-40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly
unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent
returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.
Miscellaneous
Operationally, we continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John, Elizabeth and Donna all
contributing excellent performances. At Buffett Partnership. Ltd.
we have never had to divert investment effort
to offset organizational shortcomings and this has been an important ingredient in the performance over the
years.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., aided for the second year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient
and comprehensive job.
We all continue to maintain more than an academic interest in the Partnership. The employees and I, our spouses
and children, have a total of over $10 million invested at January 1, 1967. In the case of my family, our Buffett
Partnership, Ltd. investment represents well over 90% of our net worth.
106 Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax return. This letter
is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
for 1966, setting forth the operations and financial
position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1967. This is identical
with the figures developed in the audit.
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be
about July 15 summarizing the first half of this year.
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB eh
107 BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
July 12, 1967
First Half Performance
Again, this is being ,written in late June prior to the family's trip to California.
To maintain the usual
chronological symmetry (I try to sublimate my aesthetic urges when it comes to creating symmetry in the profit
and loss statement), I
will leave a few blanks and trust that the conclusions look appropriate when the figures are
entered.
We began 1967 on a traumatic note with January turning out to be one of the worst months we have experienced
with a plus 3.3% for BPL versus a plus 8.5% for the Dow. Despite this sour start, we finished the half about plus
21% for an edge of 9.6 percentage points over the Dow. Again, as throughout 1966, the Dow was a relatively
easy competitor (it won't be every year, prevailing thinking to the contrary notwithstanding) and a large majority
of investment managers outdid this yardstick.
The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual
basis:
Year
Overall Results From
Dow (1)
Partnership Results (2)
Limited Partners’
Results (3)
1957
-8.4%
10.4%
9.3%
1958
38.5%
40.9%
32.2%
1959
20.0%
25.9%
20.9%
1960
-6.2%
22.8%
18.6%
1961
22.4%
45.9%
35.9%
1962
-7.6%
13.9%
11.9%
1963
20.6%
38.7%
30.5%
1964
18.7%
27.8%
22.3%
1965
14.2%
47.2%
36.9%
1966
-15.6%
20.4%
16.8%
First half 1967
11.4%
21.0%
17.3%
Cumulative Results
148.3%
1419.8%
843.3%
Annual Compounded
Rate
9.1%
29.6%
23.8%
(1)
Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through
ownership of the Dow during that year.
The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(2)
For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout
the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(3)
For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for
allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly
withdrawals by limited partners.
BPL's performance during the first hall reflects no change in valuation of our controlled companies and was thus
achieved solely by the 63.3% of our net assets invested in marketable securities at the beginning of the year.
108 Any revaluation of Diversified Retailing Company (DRC) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (B-H) will be made in
December prior to the time the commitment letters become final and will be based upon all relevant criteria
(including current operating.
market and credit conditions) at that time.
Both DRC and B-H made important acquisitions during the first half. The overall progress of DRC (80%
owned) and both of its subsidiaries (Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) is highly satisfactory.
However, B-H is experiencing and faces real difficulties in the textile business, while I don't presently foresee
any loss in underlying values. I similarly see no prospect of a good return on the assets employed in the textile
business. Therefore, this segment of our portfolio will be a substantial drag on our relative performance (as it
has been during the first half) if the Dow continues to advance. Such relative performance with controlled
companies is expected in a strongly advancing market, but is accentuated when the business is making no
progress. As a friend of mine says.
“Experience is what you find when you're looking for something else.”
Investment Companies
The usual comparison follows showing the results of the two largest open-end and two largest closed-end
investment companies which pursue a policy of 95-100% investment in common stocks.
Year
Mass.
Inv.
Trust (1)
Investors
Stock (1)
Lehman (2)
Tri-Cont
(2)
Dow
Limited
Partners
1957
-11.4%
-12.4%
-11.4%
-2.4%
-8.4%
9.3%
1958
42.7%
47.5%
40.8%
33.2%
38.5%
32.2%
1959
9.0%
10.3%
8.1%
8.4%
20.0%
20.9%
1960
-1.0%
-0.6%
2.5%
2.8%
-6.2%
18.6%
1961
25.6%
24.9%
23.6%
22.5%
22.4%
35.9%
1962
-9.8%
-13.4%
-14.4%
-10.0%
-7.6%
11.9%
1963
20.0%
16.5%
23.7%
18.3%
20.6%
30.5%
1964
15.9%
14.3%
13.6%
12.6%
18.7%
22.3%
1965
10.2%
9.8%
19.0%
10.7%
14.2%
36.9%
1966
-7.7%
-10.0%
-2.6%
-6.9%
-15.6%
16.8%
First half
1967
11.3%
12.3%
19.3%
14.4%
11.4%
17.3%
Cumulative
Results
143.3%
126.4%
185.4%
156.8%
148.3%
843.3%
Annual
Compounded
Rate
8.9%
8.1%
10.5%
9.4%
9.1%
23.8%
(1)
Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(2)
From 1967 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1966.
Estimated for first half of 1967.
The tide continues to be far more important than the swimmers.
Taxes
We entered 1967 with unrealized gains of $16,361,974. Through June 30 we have realized net capital gains of
$7,084,104 so it appears likely that we will realize in 1967 a fairly substantial portion of the unrealized gain
attributable to your interest at the beginning of the year. This amount was reported to you as Item 3 of our
February 2, 1967 letter. A copy of that letter, along with a tax letter, will be mailed to you in November giving a
rough idea of the tax situation at that time.
109 As I regularly suggest, the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1967
as your actual tax was for 1966. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
Whatever our final figure, it looks now as if it will be very largely long term capital gain with only minor
amounts, if any, of short term gain and ordinary income.
(I consider the whole Income-Principal Myth fair game
for one of my soft-spoken gently worded critiques. As I told Susie in the early days of our marriage, “Don't
worry about the income; just the outcome.”)
Miscellaneous
During the first half, Stan Perimeter resigned from the Dissolution Committee because of his present full-time
involvement in investment management. Fred Stanback, Jr., a long time partner and experienced investor, was
elected by the remaining members to fill the vacancy.
As in past years, we will have a report out about November 11 along with the Commitment Letter, and the rough
estimate of the 1967 tax situation, etc.
However, there will be a special letter (to focus your attention upon it) in October. The subject matter will not
relate to change in the Partnership Agreement, but will involve some evolutionary changes in several "Ground
Rules" which I want you to have ample time to contemplate before making your plans for 1968.
Whereas the
Partnership Agreement represents the legal understanding among us, the "Ground Rules" represent the personal
understanding and in some ways is the more important document. I consider it essential that any changes be
clearly set forth and explained prior to their effect on partnership activity or performance – hence, the October
letter.
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEBeh
110 BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
October 9, 1967
To My Partners:
Over the past eleven years, I have consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal an average advantage in our
performance of ten percentage points per annum in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Under
the environment that existed during that period.
I have considered such an objective difficult but obtainable.
The following conditions now make a change in yardsticks appropriate:
The market environment has changed progressively over the past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution
in the number of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available;
Mushrooming interest in investment performance (which has its ironical aspects since I was among a
lonely few preaching the importance of this some years ago) has created a hyper-reactive pattern of
market behavior against which my analytical techniques have limited value;
The enlargement of our capital base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing trickle of
good investment ideas has continued to present the problems mentioned in the January, 1967 letter; and
My own personal interests dictate a less compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I
was younger and leaner.
Let's look at each of these factors in more detail.
The evaluation of
securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative
and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say.
"Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price
will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and
the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money
can be made with either approach.
And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his
classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to
his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no
one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had
over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a "high-probability
insight". This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights
usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the
head with a baseball bat.
So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative
decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative
decisions.
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and
recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such
as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may
111 be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it's vice versa - I'll let the
behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be
due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what
existed some years ago.
Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as
determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time.
There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative
judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our
good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in investment performance. For years I have preached the
importance of measurement. Consistently I have told partners that unless our performance was better than
average, the money should go elsewhere. In recent years this idea has gained momentum throughout the
investment (or more importantly, the investing) community. In the last year or two it has started to look a bit
like a tidal wave.
I think we are witnessing the distortion of a sound idea.
I have always cautioned partners that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether we were
"performing". Naturally, as the investment public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of expectations has
been consistently reduced to the point where investment performance by
large aggregates of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly, and perhaps sometimes even more
frequently (leading to what is known as "instant research"). The payoff for superior short term performance has
become enormous, not only in compensation for results actually achieved, but in the attraction of new money for
the next round. Thus a self-generating type of activity has set in which leads to larger and larger amounts of
money participating on a shorter and shorter time span.
A disturbing corollary is that the vehicle for
participation (the particular companies or stocks) becomes progressively less important - at times virtually
incidental - as the activity accelerates.
In my opinion what is resulting is speculation on an increasing scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon;
however, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of professional (in many cases formerly quite
docile) investors who feel they must “get aboard”. The game is dignified, of course, by appropriate ceremonies,
personages and lexicon. To date it has been highly profitable. It may also be that this is going to be the standard
nature of the market in the future. Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not do particularly
well. As I said on page five of my last annual letter,
"Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an
attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations.
Such so-called 'fashion' investing has
frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in
January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does
not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my
temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach – hence, I will most
certainly not do so with your money.”
Any form of hyper-activity with large amounts of money in securities markets can create problems for all
participants. I make no attempt to guess the action of the stock market and haven't the foggiest notion as to
whether the Dow will be at 600, 900 or 1200 a year from now. Even if there are serious consequences resulting
from present and future speculative activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are meaningless.
However,
I do believe certain conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in markets more difficult for us for the
intermediate future.
The above may simply be "old-fogeyism" (after all, I
am
37). When the game is no longer being played your
way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etc. I have been scornful of
such behavior by others in the past. I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate conditions as
112 they were - not as they are. Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am
clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even
though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully
understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of
capital.
The third point of difficulty involves our much greater base of capital.
For years my investment ideas were
anywhere from 110% to 1000% of our capital. It was difficult for me to conceive that a different condition could
ever exist. I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January, 1967 letter had to make good on that
promise. Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned, our greater capital is now something of a
drag on performance. I believe it is the least significant factor of the four mentioned, and that if we were
operating with one-tenth of our present capital our performance would be little better. However, increased funds
are presently a moderately negative factor.
The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set
the motor that regulated the treadmill at "ten points better than the DOW". I was younger, poorer and probably
more competitive.
Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance.
I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill. I have
observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming
accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two
Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was
dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the
fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior
may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English
countryside.
He received assenting nods and continued stealing.
He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors,
was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly
proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense.
I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean
activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do
not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a
satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business
even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return.
More money would be made
buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly
when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their
performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not
make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have
always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside
potential will merely be less.
Specifically, our longer term goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or a five percentage point
advantage over the Dow. Thus, if the Dow averages -2% over the next five years, I would hope to average +3%
but if the Dow averages +12%, I will hope to achieve an average of only +9%.
These may be limited objectives,
but I consider it no more likely that we will achieve even these more modest results under present conditions
than I formerly did that we would achieve our previous goal of a ten percentage point average annual edge over
the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort (I'm quite sure the converse is
113 true).
I will incorporate this new goal into the Ground Rules to be mailed you about November 1, along with the 1968
Commitment Letter. I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so you would have ample time to
consider your personal situation, and if necessary get in touch with me to clear up some of the enclosed, before
making a decision on 1968. As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my capital (excluding Data
Documents stock), along with that of my family, in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and achievable may well
be different from what you consider so.
Partners with attractive alternative investment opportunities may
logically decide that their funds can be better employed elsewhere, and you can be sure I will be wholly in
sympathy with such a decision.
I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly announces one set of goals and motivations when
actually an entirely different set of factors prevails. Therefore, I have always tried to be l00% candid with you
about my goals and personal feelings so you aren't making important decisions pursuant to phony proclamations
(I've run into a few of these in our investment experience). Obviously all the conditions enumerated in this letter
haven't appeared overnight. I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a long period of time.
You can understand, I am sure, that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been achieved to set forth a
reduction in future goals.
I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I had fulfilled my
objectives to this point.
Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any portion of this letter.
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB eh